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1. Introduction 
The second half of the twentieth century saw a major shift in global shipbuilding from Europe to East 
Asia. From 1977 to 1985 the market share of European shipyards dropped from 41 % to 18 % while 
shipyards in Asia increased the market share from 46 % to 70 % (Stopford, 2009). A combination of 
modern production facilities, low wages, and massive state support allowed shipyards in Japan and 
Korea to successfully outcompete the European shipping industry (Amsden, 1989; Chida & Davis, 
1990; Bruno & Tenold, 2011). 
The decline of European shipbuilding has been studied thoroughly in the past decades (Stråth, 1987; 
Bohlin, 1989; Todd, 1991; Lorenz, 1991, Burton, 1994; De Voogd, 1995, 2007; Johnman & Murphy, 
2002; Poulsen and Sornn-Friese, 2011). However there is a lack of studies that examine the long term 
consequences of the shipyard closures (exceptions are Andersen and Storrie, 1996; Olesen, 2012, 2013, 
2016; Larsen, 2016; Holm et al., 2017). The lack of focus on the time after the delivery of the last ship 
has led to an incomplete picture of the shipyard closures that emphasize the story of decline. 
This paper argues that the closure of the Danish shipbuilding industry should be interpreted as a story 
of transformation. The paper examines the closure of four Danish shipyards: Burmeister and Wain in 
Copenhagen (closed in 1980), Nakskov Shipyard (closed in 1986-87), Aalborg Shipyard (closed in 
1987-88), and Danyard Frederikshavn (closed in 1999). The paper addresses four research questions: 
(1) what activities were continued from the four shipyards? (2) How have these activities evolved after 
the shipyard closures? (3) What happened to the redundant shipyard employees? And (4) what factors 
have contributed to the transformation of the Danish shipbuilding industry? 
 
 The theoretical outset of this paper is Joseph Schumpeter’s theory of creative destruction and 
entrepreneurial profit (Schumpeter, 1934, 1939, and 1943). Schumpeter identified the creative 
destruction process where old firms vanish and new firms will appear as the engine of the capitalist 
system. The process is driven by innovative entrepreneurs who in the pursuit of entrepreneurial profit 
tear down old structures and make new combinations. Schumpeter points to five innovative processes 
through which the entrepreneur can obtain entrepreneurial profit: (1) the introduction of a new and 
more efficient method of production, (2) development of new or better products, (3) accessing new 
markets, (4) introducing new raw materials or semi-finished products that makes the end product 
cheaper, and (5) through the establishment of a new industrial organization. The advantage that the 
entrepreneur will gain is however short lived, as competitors will quickly copy the initiative. This 
means that entrepreneurs will have to continuously be innovative. 
The paper identifies 27 spin-off firms that continued activities from the four shipyards. By 2013 twelve 
of these spin-offs remained. These firms had used the resources from the shipyards to develop new 
products, access new markets, and establish new industrial organizations. Several of the spin-offs had 
evolved into global market leaders in the areas of marine engine design, marine boilers, inert-gas 
systems, thermal fluid systems, diesel power plant contracting, and software systems for shipyards. The 
paper also finds that between 60 and 70 % of the 9,399 shipyard workers had found employment three 
years after the closures. And in the seven years that followed the closures 81-92% had been 
reemployed at some point. 
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 describes the decline of the Danish shipbuilding industry. 
The establishment and development of the spin-off firms is analyzed in section 3. Section 4 presents 
the quantitative study of the shipyard workers, and section 5 discusses how various factors contributed 
to the transformation of Danish shipbuilding.  
2. The decline of the Danish shipbuilding industry 
During the first half of the 20th century global shipbuilding was completely dominated by countries in 
Western Europe. Great Britain was by far the largest shipbuilding nation in the world but Danish 
shipyards also played an important role in global shipbuilding. The first Danish steel shipyards were 
established in the 19th century. Among these were B&W in Copenhagen (established in 1843) and 
 
 Frederikshavn Shipyard (1870). The early 20th century saw a second wave of new shipyards including 
the shipyards in Aalborg (1912) and Nakskov (1916) (Olesen, 2016). 
Most of the large Danish shipyards were established and owned by the leading Danish shipping 
companies including A.P. Møller, DFDS, J. Lauritzen and the East Asiatic Company. This allowed the 
shipyards to get support from the owners – either through orders or cash injections – in depressed 
markets (Poulsen & Sornn-Friese, 2011). B&W was, however, not owned by a shipping company and 
was thus dependent on goodwill from the banks and the Danish government (Lange, 2001). 
After the Oil Crisis in 1973 the European shipbuilding industry began to experience serious problems 
caused by the low demand for new ships and increased competition from shipyards in Asia. Economic 
support from the Danish government and the owners and attempts to streamline the production was not 
enough to turn things around. In November 1980 B&W in Copenhagen was declared bankrupt. This 
marked the beginning of a series of Danish shipyard closures in the 1980’s and 1990’s. Elsinore 
Shipyard was closed in 1983 followed by Nakskov Shipyard (1986-87), Aalborg Shipyard (1987-88), 
the reestablished B&W Shipyard (1996), Nordsøværftet (1997), Svendborg Shipyard (1999), Aarhus 
Flydedok (1999), and Danyard Frederikshavn (1999). In 2012 the last major Danish newbuilding steel 
shipyard at Lindø vas closed (Olesen, 2016). 
3. The establishment of new firms from the closed shipyards 
The closure of the Danish shipyards forced the owners, workers and managers to consider how to use 
the competencies and production facilities at the shipyards in new ways. During the closures at least 27 
new firms were spun out from the shipyards (figure 1). Spin-offs are in this case defined as new firms 
where the majority of employees were previously hired at the shipyards.  
During the 1980 closure of B&W the management spun out and sold a number of divisions and offices 
as independent firms. The engine division (spun out as B&W Diesel) was the second largest developer 
of two stroke ship engines in the world. The steam division (B&W Energy) produced boilers to the 
industry and power plants. The Contractor division (B&W Scandinavian Contractor) contracted turn-
key power plants, and the design office was spun out as B&W Shipdesign. In 1981 a new shipyard 
 
 (B&W Skibsværft) was made by the management, and in 1983 the shipyard site was spun out in a real 
estate firm (Refshaleøens Ejendomsselskab) (Olesen, 2016). 
Figure 1: Spin-off from the four Danish shipyards 
 
When Nakskov Shipyard closed in 1986-87 the management spun out the design activities (Skibs og 
Maskin Consult), a blacksmith firm (Remming & Co.), and a maritime business consultancy firm 
(Viktor Møller). A group of local businessmen established a repair shipyard (Nakskov Skibsentreprise) 
and acquired the steel production facilities (BM Sektionsbyggeri). And finally the owner, the East 
Asiatic Company, converted the shipyard site into a business park (Olesen, 2016). 
In 1987-88 the owner (J. Lauritzen) and the management in Aalborg Shipyard spun out the boiler 
division (Aalborg Boilers Land and Aalborg Marine Boilers), which designed and produced boilers for 
 
 industry, power plants and ships. The owner and the management furthermore spun out the steel 
production activities (Aalborg Stålkonstruktioner), the pipe factory (Aalborg Rør), and transformed the 
shipyard site into a business park (NICA). The shipbuilding activities were reestablished by the 
management as two separate firms: Danyard Aalborg made warships in fiberglass and Aalborg 
Aluminiumskonstruktioner made lightweight aluminum catamaran ferries. A local businessman 
established a firm which was specialized in outfitting passenger ships (O.C. International and later 
Danish interior). Finally, three firms were established by the shipyard workers: A sign workshop (Dan 
Skilte), a blacksmith firm (Nordjyllands Industriservice), and a consulting engineering firm 
(Logimatic) (Olesen, 2016). 
In Frederikshavn the management spun out the pipe factory (Danyard Pipe) and parts of the design 
office (Danyard engineering). The owner (J. Lauritzen) turned the site into a business park (FME), and 
the neighboring shipyard (Ørskov Christensen Steel Shipyard) rented and later bought the dock area. 
Finally, a maritime consultant engineering firm (CH Marine Consult) was established by an engineer 
from the design office (Olesen, 2013). 
As outlined above, the activities in the spin-off firms were initially very similar to the activities of the 
closed shipyards. The new firms were mainly engaged in (1) reconstructed shipbuilding activities, (2) 
as suppliers for other shipyards (ship engines, marine boilers, steel sections, pipes etc.), (3) in power 
plant activities (contracting and boiler systems), (4) as (maritime) consultant engineering firms, and (5) 
as business parks where the production facilities at shipyard site was rented to other firms. It is thus 
evident that the shipyard closures did not see any immediate creative initiatives. Rather it took a few 
years before the spin-off firms began to experiment with different types of innovation. 
3.1 Spin-offs with the same challenges as the shipyards 
In 2013 – almost 35 years after the closure of B&W – 15 of the original 27 spin-offs had disappeared. 
Most of the spin-offs that had vanished had failed to transform themselves. They had continued the 
shipbuilding activities or had become suppliers for the remaining Danish shipyards (see table 1). As a 
consequence they also faced the same challenges as the closed shipyards: B&W Skibsværft continued 
to produce bulk carriers and product tankers until its bankruptcy in 1996. BM Sektionsbyggeri made 
steel sections for B&W Skibsværft and went out of business when the shipyard closed. Aalborg 
 
 Stålkonstruktioner and Aalborg Rør delivered pipes and steel sections to Danyard in Frederikshavn. 
When Danyard was closed in 1999 both firms went out of business. All of these spin offs failed to 
develop new products, identify new markets, or make new organizational setups. They kept on doing 
what the shipyards had done and as a consequence they went out of business in the 1990’s or 2000’s. 
Table 1: Spin-off from the Danish shipyards were closed 
Spin-off firm Parent Activity when established Activity when closed Closed 
B&W Skibsværft B&W Shipbuilding Shipbuilding 1996 
Danyard Aalborg Aalborg Shipbuilding Shipbuilding 2009 
Aalborg Aluminiumskonstruktioner Aalborg Shipbuilding Shipbuilding 1996 
Nakskov Skibsentreprise Nakskov Ship repair Ship repair 2006 
Skibs og Maskin Consult/ 
SMC Marine 
Nakskov Ship repair  
Consulting engineers  
Ship repair  
Consulting engineers 
1994 
Remming & Co. Nakskov Blacksmith Blacksmith, electrician and 
plumbing firm 
2008 
BM Sektionsbyggeri Nakskov Steel constructions Steel constructions 1996 
Aalborg Stålkonstruktioner Aalborg Steel constructions Steel constructions 1998 
Aalborg Rør Aalborg Pipe factory Pipe factory 1997 
Danyard Engineering Danyard Consulting engineers Consulting engineers 2003 
Shipbuilding Services Int. B&W Consulting engineers Consulting engineers 2009 
Viktor Møller Nakskov Management consultants Management consultants 2001 
O.C. International Aalborg Ship interior Ship interior 1992 
Danish Interior Aalborg Ship interior Ship interior 2008 
Source: Olesen, 2016 
Note: It has not been possible to track B&W Shipbuilding Service after it was sold to DFDS in 1980 
 
3.2 Development of new products 
While some spin-offs were unable to transform their business model other were more successful in 
adapting to the changing conditions. By 2013 several of the 12 remaining spin-offs had used the 
competencies and knowhow from the shipyards to develop new products (see table 2). 
Among the best example of product innovation is the spin-off firm Logimatic which was established in 
1987 by four electrical engineers from the automation department at Aalborg Shipyard. The 
entrepreneurs wanted to form a maritime consultant engineering firm. In order to support this activity 
they developed an inventory management system called MARS. MARS was initially only intended for 
internal use but it proved to very efficient for managing the flow of materials at shipyards. In the early 
1990’s the system was further developed in close collaboration with the Danish shipyard Aarhus 
Flydedok and Kværner Masa Yards in Finland. With the world’s largest producer of cruise ships on the 
 
 reference list the firm got its global breakthrough, and today MARS is used by shipyards all over the 
world. Logimatic has furthermore developed the MARS platform to target other customer groups. 
Today the firm offers waste management systems, retail store inventory management systems, and 
maintenance systems for shipping companies. In 2010 Logimatic Software was sold to Aveva which is 
the world’s leading provider of software systems to the shipbuilding industry (Olesen, 2016). 
Table 2: Remaining spin-offs by 2013 
Spin-off firm Shipyard Activity when established Activity in 2013 
MAN Diesel & Turbo B&W Production and development 
of ship diesel engines 
Development of ship diesel engines 
(production has been outsourced – 
mainly to license takers in Asia) 
B&W Energy B&W R&D and production of boiler 
systems for coal power plants  
Development of boiler systems for 
biomass- and coal power plants.  
Production has been outsourced. 
B&W Scandinavian Contractor B&W Contracting of diesel power 
plant 
Contracting, financing, operation and 
maintenance of biomass and diesel 
power plants 
Alfa Laval Aalborg ÅV Development and 
manufacturing of boilers for 
industry, power plants, and 
ships. 
Development and (offshored) 
production of marine boilers, 
thermal fluid systems, Inert-gas 
systems and industrial boilers 
Logimatic ÅV Consulting engineers Software developers 
Consulting engineers 
Dan Skilte ÅV Production of signs Production of signs 
NIS ÅV Steel and shipbuilding 
activities 
Steel and shipbuilding activities 
VICTOR DY Pipe production Pipe production and cooling systems 
CH Marine Consult DY Consulting engineers Consulting engineers 
FME DY Business park Business park 
Refshaleøens Ejendomsselskab B&W Property management Property management 
Nakskov Industri- & Miljøpark NS Business park Business park 
Source: Olesen, 2016 
 
B&W Scandinavian Contractor is another example of a shipyard spin-off that has developed new 
products. When the firm was spun out from B&W it contracted diesel power plant. In the late 1980s, 
however, the management saw a business opportunity in offering lifetime operation and maintenance 
service on the power plant that were contracted. This has later developed into the most important 
activity of the firm. In the 1990 the firm also expanded into the biomass plants in order to meet the 
demand for green energy solutions. And in 2013 it began to offer financing solutions on the power 
plant projects (Olesen, 2016). 
 
 3.3 Identifying new markets   
Apart from developing new products, a number of firms have successfully been able to target new 
markets. Spin-offs such as Dan Skilte, Nordjyllands Industriservice, CH Marine Consult and Danyard 
Pipe have identified local or regional niches where they have established themselves as craftsmen or 
service providers. These firms were all relatively small spin-offs established by former shipyard 
employees (Olesen, 2016). 
Another group of shipyard spin-offs have developed in a completely different direction. These firms 
have managed to establish themselves as global players that generate their main revenue abroad. 
Among these firms are some of the largest spin-offs including B&W Diesel, Aalborg Boilers, B&W 
Scandinavian Contractor, B&W Energy, Logimatic, and Aveva Denmark. Most of these firms were 
shipyard divisions that were identified by the shipyard management. They are characterized by a much 
larger turnover and employment compared to the local and regional spin-offs mentioned above. B&W 
Diesel, Aalborg Boilers and Aveva Denmark are all suppliers to the shipbuilding industry. For these 
firms, the global dislocation of the shipbuilding industry in the past decades has meant that the main 
customers are today situated in Asia. They furthermore have after-sales activities all over the world. A 
similar pattern can be identified in the power plant segment where B&W Scandinavian Contractor has 
customers in the Caribbean and Asia, while B&W Energy has been dependent on the European market. 
3.4 Growth through new industrial organizations  
In addition to creating new products and developing new markets, Schumpeter argues that 
entrepreneurs can innovate through new industrial setups. In this regard we have seen that the largest 
shipyard spin-offs have undergone profound changes in the past three decades. The Danish shipyards 
were characterized by very concentrated value chains, where all activities from research and 
development to production and after sales activities were located in Denmark. This was initially also 
the case for most of the firms that were established from the shipyards. Today, however, all of the 
major spin-offs have established global value chains. This change has partly been made to reduce 
production costs, but also to be close to the customers. The manufacturing activities have increasingly 
been dislocated to low-wage countries near the customers, while more value-added activities such as 
R&D has been kept in Denmark (Olesen, 2016). 
 
 B&W Diesel is a good example of this development. When the firm was spun out in 1980 the 
production facilities were located in Copenhagen. The dislocation of shipbuilding activities to Asia 
however saw a declining demand for ship engines in Europe, and in 1987 the factory in Copenhagen 
was closed. This was followed by the closure of the production sites in Holeby and Frederikshavn in 
2005 and 2010. Today MAN Diesel & Turbo (the former B&W Diesel) has no manufacturing activities 
of significance in Denmark, and the two stroke ship engines are mainly produced by licensees in Asia. 
B&W Scandinavian Contractor and B&W Energy have also outsourced all manufacturing activities 
while Alfa Laval Aalborg (the former Aalborg Boilers) has offshored these activities to China. 
The firms have also undergone a significant change in terms of ownership structure. The Danish 
shipyards were all owned by Danish firms. By 2013, however, all of the largest spin-offs were owned 
by multinational firms with headquarters abroad. B&W Diesel was acquired by the German company 
MAN in 1980. B&W Scandinavian Contractor was owned by the Swedish firm Götaverken from 1980 
to 1990 and is today owned by the Japanese firm Mitsui. B&W Energy was sold in 1980 to F. Lentjes 
in Germany. Aalborg Boilers was sold to a group of capital funds in 2000 before being acquired by the 
firm was acquired by the Swedish firm Alfa Laval in 2011. And finally, Logimatic Software was sold 
to the UK based firm Aveva in 2010 (Olesen, 2016). 
The ability to develop new products, identify new markets and form new industrial setups has, 
however, not been any guarantee for success or even survival. Several of the firms that have 
disappeared attempted to adapt to the changed conditions. Danyard Aalborg used the production 
facilities and the employees’ knowhow on fiberglass to develop new luxury yachts but went out of 
business in 2005. Aalborg Aluminiumskonstruktioner developed a groundbreaking aluminum 
catamaran ferry design, but was unable to compete with shipyards in Australia. O.C International, 
Skibs og Maskin Consult, and SMC Marine found new customers abroad. However, they went 
bankrupt when these customers failed to meet the terms of payment. And finally, Nakskov 
Skibsentreprise and Danyard Aalborg created a new organizational setup where they reduced the fixed 
organization to a minimum and relied on subcontractors that were hired in for each task. None of these 
attempts were, however, successful (Olesen, 2016). 
 
 
 3.5 Status in 2013: Fewer employees and more value added 
In the creative destruction process entrepreneurs combine the existing factors of production in new and 
more viable ways. In this regard it is relevant to compare the activities at the shipyards with the 
activities in the spin-off firms. Table 3 shows the employment, turnover and results of the four 
shipyards in 1975 when the tonnage deliveries peaked. Table 4 shows the same information for the 
spin-offs by 2013. Some reservations have to be made when comparing these numbers. Logimatic 
Software and Aalborg Boilers were acquired by multinational enterprises in 2010 and 2011 and 
integrated in the new organization. This makes it difficult to trace the original activities in 2013. I have 
therefore included the key figures from the last year before the acquisitions. A second reservation has 
to be made regarding the key figures from MAN Diesel & Turbo. Here the latest available data is from 
2007 when the shipbuilding and ship engine markets experienced a hitherto unprecedented upswing. In 
comparison 2013 was characterized by depressed market conditions. With these reservations in mind, 
however, it is possible to compare the activities in the spin-off firms with those of the shipyards.  
Table 3: Employment, turnover and result og result for the shipyards in 1975 
 Employees Turnover (DDK) Result (DKK) 
B&W 7.838 1.767 million 25,1 million 
Nakskov 
Skibsværft 
2.245 337,2 million -3,2 million 
Aalborg Værft 2.766 467,7 million 14 million 
Danyard 
Frederikshavn 
1.112 230,8 million 2,5 million 
Total 13.961 2,8 billion 38,4 million 
Sources: Annual reports from the four shipyards in 1975 
 
First, I find that there has been a drastic reduction in the employment when comparing the shipyards 
and the spin-offs. The four shipyards employed 13,961 workers in 1975. In 2013 the 12 spin-offs 
employed approximately 3,000 people. We have also identified a change in the composition of 
employees. At the shipyards approximately 75 % of the employees were blue-collar workers and 25 % 
white collar workers. Today this balance has tipped in favor of employees with academic backgrounds. 
In 2011 61 % of the employees at B&W Scandinavian Contractor had a bachelor degree, a master 
degree or a PhD degree (Olesen 2016). 
  
 
 Table 4: : Employment, turnover and result og result for the spin-offs in 2013 
 Employees Turnover (DKK) Result (DKK) 
MAN Diesel & Turbo DK: 1.916 (2013) DK: 7.5 billion. (2007) DK: 1 billion (2007) 
BWSC DK: 296 (2013) 
Total: 450 (2013) 
DK: 1.3 billion (2013) 
Total: 1.5 billion (2013) 
DK: 59 million (2013) 
Total: 65 million (2013) 
BWE DK: 140 (2013) DK: 327 million (2013) DK: 3 million (2013) 
Alfa Laval Aalborg DK: 465 (2013) 
DK: 524 (2010) 
Total: 2.523 (2010) 
DK: 1 billion (2013) 
DK: 1.3 billion (2010) 
Total: 2.6 billion (2010) 
DK: 86 million (2013) 
DK: 332 million (2010) 
Total: 332 million (2010) 
Logimatic Total: 68 (2013) 
Total: 131 (2009) 
Total: 59 million (2013) 
Total: 128 million (2009) 
Total: 6 million (2013) 
Total: 13 million (2009) 
Dan Skilte DK: 9 (2013) - DK: 78,000 (2013) 
NIS DK: 35 (2013) - DK: 1 million (2013) 
CH Marine Consult DK: 18 (2013) - DK: 4,8 million (2013) 
VICTOR DK: 65 (2013) - DK: -4 million (2013) 
FME DK: 10 (2013) DK: 18 million (2013) DK: 0.84 million (2013) 
Refshaleøens 
Ejendomsselskab 
DK: 10 (2013) DK: 32 million (2013) DK: 2.5 million (2013) 
Nakskov Industri- & 
Miljøpark 
- - - 
Source: Navne & Numre Database (for MAN Diesel & Turbo: Annual report for 2007, s.7) 
Note: For MAN Diesel & Turbo the latest key figures are from 2007. For Logimatic and Alfa Laval Aalborg I have 
added the key figures for the year prior to their merger with Aveva and Alfa Laval (2009 and 2010) to give an 
impression of the size of these activities before they were acquired. 
 
Second, the spin-offs deliver far higher profits than the shipyards. In 1975 the four shipyards delivered 
a result of 38.8 million DKK (169 million DKK in 2010 prices) from a turnover of 2.8 billion DKK 
(12.3 billion DKK in 2010 prices). In 2007 the Danish activities in MAN (the former B&W Diesel) 
made a profit of 1 billion DKK from a turnover of 7.5 billion DKK (1.07 billion DKK and 8.04 billion 
DKK in 2010-prices). If you add the key figures from Logimatic and Aalborg industries the last year 
before they were acquired (in 2009 and 2010 respectively), and the 2013 key figures from the 
remaining firms we reach a profit of 1.5 billion DDK from a turnover of 12 billion DKK. If we only 
include the Danish activities the numbers are 1.15 billion DKK from a turnover of 10.5 billion DKK (in 
2010 prices). Despite the fact that these are rough numbers and that certain reservations have to be 
taken, it clear that the spin-offs were far more profitable than the shipyards. It may be more surprising 




 4. The workers at the Danish shipyards 
This section examines what happened to the 9.399 employees that lost their jobs when the four 
shipyards closed. The study is based on quantitative data from the Danish Workforce Database (IDA) 
which is provided by Statistics Denmark. Every November since 1980 data Statistics Denmark has 
collected register data on each individual worker and workplace in Denmark. By connecting the 
individual worker and workplace it is possible to study movements in the Danish labor market over 
time. 
Figure 2: Data collection for study of redundant shipyard employees   
 
First, I have identified all the workers that left the four shipyards three years prior to the closure. 
Second, I examine what had happened to this population of workers three years after the closure (figure 
2). As the data does not allow me to examine the closure of B&W in 1980, I have included data from 
the 1996 closure of B&W Shipyard, which continued the shipbuilding activities from B&W.  
Table 5: Education, mobility, wages, and dispersion of re-employed shipyard workers 
 
 Nakskov Aalborg B&W Danyard 
Data collection period 1984-1986 1984-1986 1993-1995 1997-1999 
Employees who left the shipyards 1,382 4,599 2,042 1,376 
Re-employed after 3 years (in percent) 855 (61.9) 3,189 (69.3) 1,443 (70.7) 884 (64.2) 
Re-employed worker has... (in percent)         
 ... higher education 37 (4.3) 228 (7.1) 109 (7.6) 47 (5.4) 
 ... moved to other municipality 140 (16.4) 407 (12.8) 279 (19.3) 78 (8.8) 
 ... higher hourly wage 663 (87.5) 2,286 (86.0) 665 (49.8) 457 (55.8) 
 ... higher taxable income 460 (53.8) 1,753 (55.0) 508 (35.2) 313 (35.4) 
 ... employment in i top-5 firm 269 (31.5) 1,390 (43.6) 142 (9.8) 205 (23.2) 
 
Source: Statistics Denmark, IDA database 




 Table 5 shows the employment characteristics of the shipyard workers three years after the closure. The 
first row shows the data collection period while the second row show the number of employees that left 
the individual shipyard in that period. The third row shows the number of employees that found new 
jobs after three years and the percentage of reoccupied workers for each shipyard (e.g. 1,382 workers 
left Nakskov. 855 were reoccupied after three years. This amounts to 61.9 percent of all the workers 
who left Nakskov). The following rows show the retraining, mobility, income, and dispersion of the re-
employed workers (e.g. of the 855 re-employed workers from Nakskov 37 had obtained a higher level 
of education after they left the shipyard. This amounts to 4.3 % of the 855 re-employed workers from 
Nakskov. The same employee can appear several times (e.g. if a worker has taken a higher education 
and has moved the worker will appear in both rows).  
Table 6: Migration to other sectors (in percent) 








Workers employed three years after closure  855 3,189  1,443 884 
     
Primary sector total 2.0 0.5 0.1 1.9 
     
Manufacturing of...     
 ... food and textiles 3.0 1.9 1.3 5.8 
 ... wood and paper 0.4 0.5 1.2 0.7 
 ... chemistry and plastics 5.7 3.9 3.7 1.9 
 ... steel and machinery 33.7 38.4 18.2 19.2 
 ... electronics 4.6 1.9 3.5 6.0 
 ... transportation (shipbuilding) 5.9 19.2 1.9 17.7 
Secondary sector total  53.3 65.8 29.8 51.3 
     
Supply service (e.g. in the energy sector) 2.5 2.4 1.4 0.1 
Construction 8.4 7.2 13.1 15.8 
Trade, hotels, and restaurants 6.4 4.9 11.2 5.4 
Transport (e.g. bus driver or taxi driver) 8.4 3.5 11.4 4.0 
Business service (e.g. banking) 9.0 6.1 14.4 8.6 
Public sector service  8.0 9.0 12.1 8.6 
Other services 2.0 0.6 6.4 4.2 
Service sector total 44.7 33.7 70.0 46.7 
     
Total 100.0 100.0 99.9 99.9 
Source: Statistics Denmark 
 
 
 Table 5 shows that between 62 % (Nakskov) and 71 % (B&W) of the redundant shipyard workers 
found new jobs. And during the seven years that followed the closures 81 to 92% had been employed at 
some point in time (Holm, Østergaard and Olesen, 2017). Table 5 also shows that the level of retraining 
was very low (between 4 % and 8 %) and that the hourly wage increased more than the taxable income. 
This suggests that many shipyard workers became employed part-time (e.g. in the construction sector). 
Table 6 shows where the workers went. Most went to job in manufacturing of steel products and 
machinery (18 to 38 %) or shipbuilding (2 to 20 %).  
From table 5 and 6 it is evident that there are clear differences from shipyard to shipyard. These 
differences between the individual shipyards can be traced to the location of the shipyards (table 7). 
Table 7: Shipyard characteristics  
Shipyard and year of closure Nakskov (1986) Aalborg (1987) B&W (1996) Danyard (1999) 








Related industry in region (manufacturing of 
steel, machinery or transportation) 
Weak Strong Weak Strong 
Service jobs in region (service sector) Weak Strong Strong Weak 
Job creation in shipyard spin-offs App. 300 App. 2.800 App. 10 App. 30 
 
Nakskov Shipyard was located in a town of 16.000 inhabitants. The region was characterized by a very 
weak industry structure with few job opportunities in related industries as well as in service jobs. In 
1980 only 23 industry firms in the region employed more than 6 people and 51 % of all industry 
workers in the region worked at the shipyard. The spin-offs from Nakskov Shipyard only created 
around 300 jobs. The weak industry structure and the small spin-offs explain the low rate re-occupation 
rate of 61 %. It also explains why more than 16 % of the workers had to move to other municipalities to 
find jobs. 
Aalborg Shipyard was located Aalborg which was the fourth largest city in Denmark with 180.000 
inhabitants. The region (Northern Jutland) was characterized by a strong cluster of related industries 
including shipyards (e.g. Danyard, Ørskov and Karstensen) and shipyard suppliers (e.g. Wärtsilä and 
MAN Diesel). The spin-offs from the shipyard created around 2.800 direct workplaces. This is an 
important factor when explaining why 70 % of the employees were in new jobs after three years. The 
 
 spin-offs and the strong presence of related industries in the region also explains the migration 
manufacturing of steel and machinery (38 %) and shipbuilding (19 %). 
B&W was located in the Danish capital of Copenhagen with 470.000 inhabitants. By 1996 most firms 
engaged in manufacturing of steel, machinery and ships had left the city (Maskell, 1986 and 1992). 
However the region offered plenty of job opportunities in the service sector. This explains the high 
reemployment rate (70 %) and the migration to the service sector (70 %). The migration to a wide 
range of service jobs and the fact that the 1996 closure saw no major spin-offs explains why less than 
10 % of the reemployed workers were hired by top-5 firms. The high level of mobility (19 %) does not 
indicate that shipyard workers moved far to find new jobs. Rather it should be explained by the many 
small municipalities around Copenhagen. 
Finally, Danyard was located in Frederikshavn with 24.000 inhabitants. The region of Northern Jutland 
was characterized by a strong presence of related industries. This explains the migration to 
manufacturing of steel and machinery (19 %) and shipbuilding (17 %). The closure was furthermore 
characterized by a large migration to the construction industry (15%). The high migration to top 5 firms 
(23 %) can be explained by the fact that many workers found new jobs at the neighboring Ørskov 
Christensen Shipyard. 
5. Discussion and Conclusion 
In the previous sections I have identified 27 spin-offs that were established from the closed shipyards. 
There are two factors that may explain this development. First, the Danish shipyards had very diverse 
product portfolios. For decades Danish shipyards had made ship engines, ship designs, ship interior, 
marine boilers, and steel sections to support the shipbuilding activities. Some of these activities could 
also be used to target non-maritime sectors such as the power plant and construction industry. By the 
1970’s several of these supporting business areas were turned into independent divisions that operated 
as small firms within the shipyard organization. When the shipyards closed these divisions did not rely 
on being part of a shipyard and they were easy to spin out. Second, there was a wide range of 
innovative entrepreneurs and investors – especially among managers, owners, and workers. The 
complete lack of state support during the shipyard closures may also have played a role in forcing the 
managers and employee to be more creative. 
 
 The fact that the shipyard employees were fairly successful in securing new jobs can be explained by 
three factors. First, the establishment of spin-offs from the shipyards provided jobs for many of the 
shipyard workers in Aalborg and at the 1980 closure of B&W. Second, the fact that the employees had 
very different skills made it easier to integrate them in other parts of Danish industry. 50% of the 
redundant shipyard workers were skilled blue collar workers including smiths, metal workers, machine 
operators, painters, carpenters, electricians etc. These workers could apply their skills in several sectors 
such as manufacturing and construction (Kamedula et al., 1987). Unskilled workers and white collar 
employees (engineers, sales people, accountants and managers etc.) were also able to migrate to other 
sectors (Olesen, 2016). Third, the regional industry infrastructure had an impact. Copenhagen offered a 
wide range of service jobs, and 70 % of the reemployed workers went to this sector when B&W closed 
in 1996. In Frederikshavn and Aalborg most workers found new jobs in SME’s in the strong maritime 
industry cluster in Northern Jutland. In Nakskov the high mobility of the workforce explains why more 
than 60 % of the workers were employed after three years. 
By 2013 the Danish shipbuilding industry had largely disappeared. But the spin-offs from the Danish 
shipyards were very visible in other industries. Innovative entrepreneurs had reshuffled the resources 
and capabilities at the Danish shipyards. They had developed new products, identified new markets and 
created new industrial organizations. By 2013 the firms had ceased, outsourced or offshored the low 
value added manufacturing activities and turned the focus to high value added R&D and after sales 
activities. Today the spin-off from the Danish shipyards are global leaders in the markets for two stroke 
ship engines, marine boilers, thermal fluid systems, inert-gas systems, contracting and operating diesel 
power plants, and software development for the shipbuilding industry. The high reemployment rate, the 
low level of retraining, and the migration to neighboring sector furthermore indicates that the 
competencies at the shipyards were sought for in other parts of Danish industry.   
The closure of the Danish shipyards should thus not only be viewed as a story of decline but also as a 
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